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Introduction -
Suppose that John sells pencils under the name SCRIBBLE. John
obtained a federal registration for the trademark SCRIBBLE, which
protects John from others using SCRIBBLE on their products.' His
competitor Grant later uses the name SKRIBBLER to sell pencils.2
Suppose further that John thinks that by using the name
SKRIBBLER on Grant's pencils, Grant will confuse consumers who
intend to buy John's SCRIBBLE pencils. 3 Because of the similarity in
appearance and sound between SCRIBBLE and SKRIBBLER, John
believes that consumers will inadvertently buy SKRIBBLER pencils
when they intended to buy SCRIBBLE pencils.4
Based on his belief, John might file suit against Grant under the
Lanham Act to prevent Grant from using SKRIBBLER on Grant's
1. The Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1988). The Lanham Act sets
out procedures for federal registration of a trademark in the Principal Register. Id. §
1051-72. An applicant's first step may be to file a use application. Id. Alternatively, an
applicant may file an intent-to-use application. Id. § 1051(b). After receipt of the
application, an examiner will decide if any of the Lanham Act's statutory bars precludes
the registration. Id. § 1052. If the statute does not bar registration, then the examiner will
approve of the registration in the Official Gazette. Id. § 1063(b). The Lanham Act allows
thirty days after the publication in the Official Gazette for another party to file an
opposition. Id. § 1063. If the registration may damage another party, that party may file an
opposition. Id. § 1092. If no one files an opposition, then either a notice of registration or a
notice of allowance will be issued depending on the type of application. Id. § 1063(b). A
notice of registration ensures federal protection under the Lanham Act to a successful
trademark applicant. Id. § 1051(a). A notice of allowance issues for an intent-to-use
applicant, who has six months to use the trademark in commerce to consummate federal
protections. Id. § 1051(d). The Lanham Act requires renewal every ten years. Id. § 1059(a).
The examiner may reject the application on many grounds. Id. § 1052. When an
application is rejected, an applicant can attempt to rebut the examiner's objections to
registration. Id. § 1062(b). If the rebuttal does not satisfy the examiner, the applicant may
appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Id. § 1070. Alternatively, the applicant
can avoid challenge to the examiner's findings and alter the application according to the
examiner's demands. Id. § 1062(b).
2. See id. § 1052(d) (denying registration of trademarks that are confusingly similar
to federally registered trademark).
3. See id. § 1125(a)(1) (prohibiting use of certain commercial activities likely to
cause confusion). Anyone who uses a word, term, name, symbol, or device which is likely
to cause confusion with another's products or commercial activities will be liable in a civil
action for damages. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
4. See, e.g., Syntex Lab., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 567 (2d Cir.
1971) (upholding a preliminary injunction where the defendant's trademark
VAGESTROL infringed plaintiff's trademark VAGITROL).
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pencils.5 Under the Lanham Act, John could recoup losses and
prevent the diversion of his profits to Grant. 6 If John files suit under
the Lanham Act, a trial court will decide whether a likelihood of
confusion exists between SCRIBBLE and SKRIBBLER pencils.7 If
the trial court finds that no likelihood of confusion exists, the court
will rule for Grant. 8 John will then assess his chances for a successful
appeal.9
The Lanham Act, however, fails to address the review standard
for appeals in trademark infringement suits.10 As a result, some circuit
courts consider the likelihood of confusion inquiry a-question of fact.11
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
6. Id. § 1117. Registration is constructive notice of registrant's ownership of the
trademark. Id. § 1072. A registrant may seek remedies for violations against the
registrant's rights. Id. § 1116. Use of any trademark that copies or imitates a registered
trademark when the use will likely cause confusion violates the Lanham Act. Id. § 1114; see
also supra note 1 (delineating process to secure Lanham Act protection). The Lanham Act
vests equitable power in courts to grant injunctive relief for an infringer's violations against
a registrant's rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1114. In addition, the Lanham Act allows a plaintiff to
recover defendant's profits, damages, and costs. Id. § 1117. To recover the defendant's
profits, the plaintiff need only prove defendant's sales. Id. The court, in awarding damages,
may give a plaintiff up to three times the actual amount of damages. Id. In exceptional
cases, a court may award reasonable attorney's fees. Id.
in a typical infringement case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant's trademark
illegally copies or resembles the plaintiff's federally registered trademark. See, e.g.,
ConAgra v. George A. Hormel, & Co., 990 F.2d 368, 375 (8th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff alleging
that defendant's trademark HEALTH SELECTIONS infringed plaintiff's registered
trademark HEALTHY CHOICE). To prevail in a trademark infringement suit, the
plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff's mark is distinctive and (2) consumers may confuse
the plaintiff's products with the defendant's. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 505 U.S.
763, 769 (1992).
7. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763 (analyzing possible infringement by using
likelihood of confusion test). The likelihood of confusion test is whether similarity of
trademarks is likely to deceive or confuse the public. Id. at 780 (citing New West Corp. v.
NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979)).
8. See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir.
1979) (affirming lower court decision that defendant's trademark DRIZZLE did not
infringe plaintiff's trademark DRIZZLER).
9. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a) (allowing right of appeal from district court to court of
appeals).
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (omitting provision that specifies review standard in
infringement appeal). Judicial efforts to resolve the issue have not been successful. See
McMonagle v. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 901, 904 (1989) (White, J.,
dissenting) (favoring Court review to settle whether likelihood of confusion is question of
law, fact, or both).
11. See infra note 85 (identifying circuits that view likelihood of confusion as a
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These courts defer to the trial court's determination unless the trial
court determination is clearly erroneous. 12 Other courts consider the
likelihood of confusion inquiry a question of law resting on underlying
questions of fact. 13  These courts disregard the trial court's
determination and decide the issue independently. 14 By disagreeing
on how to characterize the likelihood of confusion inquiry, courts have
created conflicting appellate review standards. 15
The disagreement is notable because the current circuit split
frustrates Congress' goal to make uniform trademark law. 16
Consequently, differing review standards lead to forum shopping by
trademark litigants, a result Congress intended to avoid. 17 Also, by
using differing review standards, courts treat similarly situated
litigants differently.18 Therefore, courts should adopt a consistent
approach to trademark appeals, which would further congressional
intent, eliminate forum shopping, and ensure that courts treat
trademark litigants equally. 19
This article addresses the split in authority concerning the
likelihood of confusion standard of review in trademark infringement
cases. Part I discusses the Lanham Act and appellate review principles
question of fact).
12. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (describing clearly erroneous review
of likelihood of confusion in majority of circuits).
13. See infra note 100 (listing circuits that consider likelihood of confusion a question
of law).
14. See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (describing de novo review of
likelihood of confusion in minority of circuits).
15. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:22 (2d ed. Supp. 1991) (discussing conflicting review standards).
16. See S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,1277 (1946) (proposing that Congress should enact national legislation
concerning trademarks in interstate commerce); Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456
U.S. 844 (1982) (stating that the Lanham Act is a result of congressional intent to codify
and unify common law and state statutory schemes); Milton W. Handler, Are the State
Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75
TRADEMARK REP. 269, 285 (1985) (asserting that uniformity was one purpose of the
Lanham Act); Paul Heald, Comment, Unfair Competition and Federal Law: Constitutional
Restraints on the Scope of State Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411, 1434 (1987) (noting that
uniformity is one goal of the Lanham Act).
17. See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1678 (1990)
(stating that a forum shopper considers availability of appellate review).
18. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (explaining differences between
majority-rule circuits and minority-rule circuits concerning likelihood of confusion review).
19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing Lanham Act's goal of
uniformity in trademark law and forum shopping by trademark litigants).
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Part II describes the
circuit courts' inconsistent approaches to categorizing the likelihood
of confusion inquiry. Finally, Part III proposes an amendment to the
Lanham Act that balances conflicting policy concerns and
acknowledges the legal nature of the likelihood of confusion question.
I'
Lanham Trademark Act and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)
In 1946, Congress passed the Lanham Trademark Act 20 to
provide uniform protection to trademarks. 21 The Lanham Act
provides that a trademark owner may enforce her rights by filing suit
in federal court.22 Federal courts, in turn, employ the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which prescribe appellate review standards. 23
A. The Lanham Trademark Act
One of the Lanham Act's main goals is to indicate a product's
origin for the benefit of consumers.24 Trademarks accomplish this goal
by helping consumers differentiate among similar products in the
market, enabling consumers to choose the product they most desire.25
Furthermore, consumers can use trademarks to identify companies
that produce unsatisfactory products.26 For example, if a product
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
21. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir. 1959)
(explaining that Lanham Act's constructive notice provision afforded nationwide
protection). One Lanham Act goal was to eliminate the geographical limits on trademark
rights. ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 153 (1990). In addition, the Lanham Act
sought to expand registrants' access to federal courts by not requiring diversity jurisdiction.
Id.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (vesting - United States District Courts with original
jurisdiction and United States Courts of Appeals, other than the Federal Circuit, with
appellate jurisdiction).
23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (assigning clearly erroneous review to all findings of
fact).
24. See MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 21, at 150 (stating that trademark law protects
purchasers).
25. Mishakawa Rubber & Woolen .Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942).
26. See Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Founder's Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 115 F.
Supp. 787, 794 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (noting that trademarks serve to identify a product's
source).
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injures a consumer, the product's trademark indicates the product's
origin and thus identifies whom the consumer may file suit against for
her injuries.27 Recognizing the value of trademarks to consumers, the
Lanham Act prohibits a trademark's use if it is likely to cause
consumer confusion about a product's source or ownership.28
In addition, the Lanham Act protects an owner's goodwill in her
product or service.29 For example, a trademark owner may spend
years developing a product under a certain name to secure a market
for her product.30 The Lanham Act prevents others from using the
same name on a similar product to profit from the trademark owner's
efforts.31 Thus, to be legally valid, trademarks must be sufficiently
distinguishable from one another.32
A federally registered trademark owner may bring a trademark
infringement suit if she believes that another trademark will cause
consumers to mistake the source of her goods.33 Whether the plaintiff
will prevail turns on whether the defendant's trademark will likely
cause confusion about the source of the litigants' goods.34 If the
defendant's trademark will likely cause confusion as to the source of
27. See id. (stating that trademarks protect consumers in many ways).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1). Sections 1114(1) and 1125(a)(1) of the Lanham
Act both require a court to find likelihood of confusion before a defendant is liable for
trademark infringement. Brett Thomas Reynolds, Comment, Appellate Review of Lanham
Act Violations: Is Likelihood of Confusion a Question of Law or Fact?, 38 Sw. L.J. 743, 746
(1984). Section 1114(1) provides that a person may not use a trademark mark that
resembles a federally registered trademark if it will cause consumer confusion. 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1). Section 1125(a)(1), codifying case law on unfair competition, provides that a
person may not use a trademark that resembles another trademark if it will cause
consumer confusion. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
29. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DOCTRINES 200 (revised 3d ed. 1993) (stating that merchants have for centuries
used trademarks as valuable symbols of merchants' goodwill and skill).
30. See id. (stating importance of merchants' goodwill in their products).
31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating that Lanham Act prohibits
trademarks that may confuse consumers).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (prohibiting trademarks that will likely cause confusion
with another trademark).
33. See, e.g., JouJou Designs, Inc. v. JoJo Ligne Internationale, Inc., 821 F. Supp 1347,
1355 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (discussing plaintiff's allegations that defendant's trademark JOJO
infringed plaintiff's trademark JOUJOU); Dep Corp. v Opti-Ray, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 710,
712 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (discussing plaintiff's allegations that defendant's LA LOOK
trademark infringed plaintiff's L.A. LOOKS trademark).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (defendant liable if her trademark causes likely confusion
with plaintiff's trademark).
[VOL. 19:823HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
DEFINITE CONFUSION
goods, the plaintiff could, for example, obtain an injunction to stop the
defendant from using her trademark. 35 If a trial court issues an
injunction prohibiting the defendant from using her trademark, the
defendant may appeal. 36 If the defendant appeals, the appellate court
will review the trial court findings according to the appellate court's
standard of review.37
B. Defining the Standard of Review Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a)
An appellate court's standard of review depends on whether the
likelihood of confusion determination is factual or legal.38 The conflict
among circuit courts over the appropriate scope of review in
trademark infringement cases reflects an ambiguity in basic, judicial-
review principles.39 To clarify appellate judicial-review principles,
courts often distinguish between questions of fact and questions of
law.40 Generally, trial courts find facts and appellate courts review
legal issues.41 Thus, by characterizing an issue as factual or legal, a
judge allocates power between trial and appellate courts.42
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) distributes the
responsibility for particular judicial findings between trial courts and
appellate courts.43 According to Rule 52(a), appellate courts cannot
35. See, e.g., Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle Co., 171 F. Supp. 671, 677 (N.D. Ill.
1959) (holding that an injunction was the appropriate remedy when defendant's trademark
POL-PAK infringed plaintiff's trademark POLKA).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1121.
37. See infra notes 85-89, 100-104 and accompanying text (explaining different circuit
review standards for likelihood of confusion).
38. See infra notes 44, 51 and accompanying text (describing scope of review for
questions of fact and questions of law).
39. See George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Finding of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14
(1992) (explaining scope of judicial review controversy).
40. See id. (stating that no one has defined distinction between fact and law to
implicate proper review standard); see also Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing
and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 647-50
(1988) (summarizing history of appellate review of judicial fact findings).
41. - Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question
and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 994 (1986).
42. Id.
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (establishing clearly erroneous standard by allowing
appellate reversal of trial court's findings of fact only if those findings are obviously
incorrect). Rule 52(a) does not, however, illuminate how to distinguish fact from law.
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944).
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disturb a trial judge's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly
erroneous. 44 Yet in 1950, the Second Circuit announced that Rule
52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard would not apply to cases involving
only documentary evidence and no witness testimony.45 According to
the Second Circuit, appellate courts could find facts based on
documentary evidence de novo.46 The Second Circuit, thus, adopted
broad review power, believing that appellate judges and trial judges
were equally qualified to find facts from the written record.47 In 1985,
however, Congress amended Rule 52(a) to apply in all cases including
those containing only documentary evidence.48 Although this
amendment merely reiterated accepted law in most circuits, the
amendment affirmed that reviewing courts should not usurp trial
judges' power to determine facts. 49
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Courts do not have a definitive definition of clearly
erroneous. See Cooper, supra note 40, at 645 (asserting that clearly erroneous has no
definition). Judge Learned Hand found defining clearly erroneous to be a futile task. Id.
(citing Judge Hand's remark in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
433 (2d Cir. 1945)). The Supreme Court has attempted to define clearly erroneous. United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 367 (1948). The Gypsum Court
explained that a judicial finding is clearly erroneous when, although some evidence
supports the finding, the entire evidence taken as a whole firmly convinces the reviewing
court that the lower court erred. Id. at 395.
45. Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-540 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810
(1950).
46. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (mandating limited review for questions of fact and
thus impliedly preserving liberal review for questions of law). De novo means "anew" and
"afresh." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). De novo trials have traditionally
meant new adjudications independent of lower court proceedings. See id. (explaining
review power of appellate courts).
47. Orvis, 180 F.2d at 539. In Orvis, the Second Circuit stated that it could reverse
lower court findings in two other situations when the evidence is partly oral: (1) when
written evidence casted doubt on the credibility of witnesses and (2) when the credibility of
testimony is not necessary for adjudicating the case. Id.
48. See Cooper, supra note 40, at 648-649 (commenting that amendment was central
to division of power between trial judges and appellate judges); 105 F.R.D. 179, 221-23
(including comments of Advisory Committee concerning Rule 52(a)).
49. Cooper, supra note 40, at 648. Rule 52(a) provides in part: "Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous .... " FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a). In the same year, the Supreme Court confirmed that
the clearly erroneous standard of review applied to findings of both oral and documentary
fact. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). In Anderson, the Supreme Court
rejected the Second Circuit's decision in Orvis that allowed free appellate review of
documentary evidence. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. However, Anderson did not compel
clearly erroneous review for all lower court findings. Id. Instead, the Anderson Court
already assumed the factual nature of the discriminatory intent inquiry before the Court
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 19:823
In contrast to questions of fact, Rule 52(a) mandates that
questions of law warrant close appellate scrutiny.50 Under Rule 52(a),
appellate courts may reverse findings of law if a trial court's legal
conclusions are merely erroneous but not "clearly erroneous." 51 Since
appellate courts, not trial courts, declare and develop the law,
appellate courts independently review questions of law.52 Appellate
review, therefore, promotes pustice by correcting trial court legal
errors and developing the law.) 3
C. Fact, Law, and Mixed Questions
Although Rule 52(a) addresses both questions of fact and
questions of law, it does not address mixed questions of fact and law.54
The Supreme Court, however, has addressed mixed questions of fact
and law. In 1944, the Court acknowledged two tiers of findings of fact,
subsidiary and ultimate.55 The Court noted that subsidiary facts, also
known as foundational facts, are evidentiary findings. 56 The Court
stated that ultimate facts are results that courts reach through
analyzing the legal significance of subsidiary facts. 57 The Court further
explained that ultimate facts-conclusions a judge draws from
mechanically applied Rule 52(a)'s mandate of limited review. Id. at 573. Thus, Anderson
does not provide guidance in characterizing likelihood of confusion as legal or factual. See
id. (making no mention of Rule 52(a)'s applicability to questions of law). The Court
extended trial court independence to promote judicial economy. Christie, supra note 39, at
16.
Professor Christie also suggests that constitutional deference to jury findings may also
help explain increasing deference to judges. Id. at 16-17. Historically, that deference
extended to civil cases. Id. Since trial judges now accept fact-finding roles traditionally held
by juries, trial judges have embraced historical protections against appellate court
encroachment into their fact-finding duties. Id.
50. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-3 (1976) (stating that
one primary goal of appellate courts is guiding the development of law).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
52. DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 933 (2d
ed. Supp. 1992); see also Cooper, supra note 40, at 657 (arguing that appellate courts' main
responsibility is developing law).
53. See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision
of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1273 (1983) (citing Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v.
Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316, 319-20 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945) for the
proposition that the only purpose of appellate courts is to assist the trial court in arriving at
the correct result in complicated litigation).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
55. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,670-71 (1944).
56. Id. See also Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954).
57. Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 670-71.
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subsidiary facts-are subject to liberal appellate review because they
are legal conclusions a judge draws from evidence.58 By allowing de
novo appellate review of ultimate facts, the Court recognized that
ultimate facts were mixed questions consisting of both fact and law.5
9
In 1982, in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, however, the Court
expressly rejected distinctions between subsidiary and ultimate facts
when applying Rule 52(a). 60 In Pullman-Standard, the plaintiffs, black
employees, alleged that their employer and union's seniority system
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.61 The critical issue was how
courts should characterize the question of discriminatory intent in a
Title VII action.62 The District Court found for the employer and
union, holding that they did not intentionally discriminate.63 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that discriminatory intent was an
ultimate fact that it could review de novo.64 Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the District Court, finding an intent to discriminate.
65
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 66 The Court
held that labeling discriminatory intent findings as ultimate facts did
not justify de novo review.67 The Court held that the discriminatory
intent issue was entirely factual with no legal characteristics.
68
Accordingly, it held that discriminatory intent was subject to Rule
52(a)'s clearly erroneous review.69
Although Pullman-Standard specifically refused to acknowledge
that discriminatory intent was a mixed question of fact and law, it did
not generally overrule precedent supporting de novo review of mixed
questions of fact and law.70 The Pullman-Standard Court thus
conceded that de novo review of some legal questions based on
58. Id. The Baumgartner Court explained that some judicial inquiries, using the label
"finding of fact," are inferences drawn from evidence. Id Accordingly, these judicial
inquiries fall within'the scrutiny of appellate court powers. Id.
59. See id. at 677-78 (reversing lower court).
60. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,293 (1982).
61. Id. at 275.
62. Id. at 276.
63. Id. at 275.
64. Id. at 285.
65. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. at 273.
67. Id. at.293.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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evidentiary facts would still be appropriate if the question was truly
one of both fact and law.71 The Pullman-Standard Court, however, did
not specify which conclusions based on evidentiary facts are mixed
questions of fact and law.72
.The Court again tried to clarify its treatment of mixed questions
of fact and law in 1984. 73 The Court recognized that Rule 52(a) did
not provide guidelines to distinguish facts from law.74 Overruling
itself, the Court found that ultimate facts are entirely factual and thus
declared that Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard applied equally
to ultimate facts.75 Therefore, under current law, the clearly erroneous
standard applies to ultimate facts because they do not possess a legal
nature.76 This standard, however, does not foreclose de novo appellate
review of a conclusion based on evidentiary findings that a court
recognizes as truly a mixed question of fact and law.77
Under current law, Rule 52(a) does not subject all trial courts'
conclusions based on evidentiary findings to clearly erroneous
review.78 Although the Court has rejected de novo review for ultimate
facts, it has also acknowledged that certain "facts" retain a legal
nature sufficient to warrant de novo review. 79 The Supreme Court
thus permits appellate courts to exercise their corrective and
declarative roles for all questions of a legal nature.8 °
71. Id. at 286 n.16.'The Pullman-Standard Court distinguished Baumgartner. Id. The
Pullman-Standard Court held that discriminatory intent was not an ultimate fact. Id.
However, it conceded that courts should apply legal review standards to ultimate facts. Id.
72. Id. at 273-93 (omitting reference to which conclusions based on preliminary fact-
findings Court will review de novo).
73. Bose Corp. v. ConsumersUnion of United States, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
74. Id. at 501 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,288 (1982)).
75. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 501.
76. See id.
77. See id. (permitting appellate courts to correct legal errors in mixed findings of fact
and law). '
78. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text (summarizing case law interpreting
Rule 52(a)).
79. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 501 n.17 (explaining that at some point fact becomes
less like finding based on ordinary experience, acquires legal characteristics, and requires
reviewing courts' independent judgment).
80. See Cooper, supra note 40, at 660 (revealing framework that allocates judicial
power between trial and appellate courts). Professor Cooper states that courts formulate
review standards based on the need for review, not on the status of the question. Id.
Therefore, review standards, he maintains, do not ultimately depend on whether the issue
is factual or legal. Id.
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II
Current Review Standards for Trademark Infringement Suits
Findings of trademark infringement have not escaped the
controversy over the proper scope of appellate review.81 Although the
Lanham Act sought uniformity in trademark law, it fails to guide a
judge trying to characterize likelihood of confusion. 82 Circuit courts
disagree on whether likelihood of confusion is a legal or factual
inquiry.83 Accordingly, circuit courts also split on how Rule 52(a)
applies in trademark infringement appeals.84
A majority of circuits view the likelihood of confusion inquiry as
entirely factual.85 Under this approach, the trial judge considers a
variety of "confusion factors" to determine likelihood of confusion.86
81. See, e.g., Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc. 999 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding that defendant's LEEF EETER gardening products infringed plaintiff's
trademark WEED EATER).
82. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:22 (stating that traditionally courts treated
likelihood of confusion as question of fact); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976) (neglecting to
provide provisions that address whether likelihood of confusion is question of fact or law).
83. See infra notes 85-113 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistent circuit
approaches in reviewing likelihood of confusion).
84. See infra notes 85, 100 (dividing circuit courts into majority and minority
approaches).
85. Aktiebolaget Electrolux, 999 F.2d at 3 (stating that likelihood of confusion is
question of fact); Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056, 1058 (3d Cir. 1991)
(stating that likelihood of confusion is question of fact); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 458 (4th Cir. 1996) (reversing lower court because its findings of fact
were clearly erroneous); Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir.
1992) (deciding likelihood of confusion is finding of fact reviewable under clearly
erroneous standard); Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that likelihood of confusion is question of fact); ConAgra, Inc. v. George A.
Hormel, & Co., 990 F.2d 368, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that likelihood of confusion is
question of fact); Murray v. Cable Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 86 F.3d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding likelihood of confusion should be reviewed under clearly erroneous standard);
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (stating
that likelihood of confusion is question of fact); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that likelihood of confusion is
question of fact); Dieter v. B & H Indus. of Southwest Florida, Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 326 n.2
(11th Cir. 1989) (stating that likelihood of confusion is question of fact); Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that
likelihood of confusion is question of fact). These circuits all use Rule 52(a)'s clearly
erroneous standard of review for likelihood of confusion.
86. See infra note 87 (listing factors that courts incorporate into likelihood of
confusion test). Courts also refer to these preliminary findings as Polaroid factors. See
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
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The confusion factors include factual inquiries into evidence of actual
consumer confusion between trademarks, similarity between
trademarks, and consumer caution in differentiating trademarks.87
According to the majority-rule view, a confusion factor, as well as the
resulting likelihood of confusion determination, is a question of fact.88
Thus, these reviewing courts defer to trial court findings and only
reverse a trial court's decision when its findings are clearly
erroneous.
89
87. Id. at 495. Circuit courts, both majority and minority, consider a variety of
likelihood of confusion factors. The First Circuit factors are: (1) similarity of marks; (2)
similarity of goods; (3) channels of trade; (4) advertising; (5) class of prospective
purchaser; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) appellee's intent in adopting the mark; and
(8) strength of mark. Aktiebolaget Electrolux, 999 F.2d at 3-4. The Second Circuit factors
are: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) similarity between the two marks; (3)
relative positions of the two marks in the marketplace; (4) likelihood of bridging the gap;
(5) actual evidence; (6) the bad faith of defendant; (7) the quality of defendant's product;
and (8) the sophistication of the consumer group. This list does not exhaust all the court
may consider in determining likelihood of confusion. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers
& Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993). When a new entity arrives in a market,
the already established business need only prove a possibility of confusion. Country Floors,
Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056, 1064 (3d Cir. 1991). The Fifth Circuit factors are: (1) the
strength of the trademark; (2) amount of similarity between the two contested trademarks;
(3) similarity of the subject of the trademarks; (4) kind of retailers and purchasers; (5) the
kind of advertising media employed; (6) the defendant's intent; and (7) actual confusion.
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 960 F.2d at 486. The Sixth Circuit factors are: (1) the strength
of plaintiff's trademark; (2) relatedness between the parties' products; (3) similarity
between the trademarks; (4) actual confusion; (5) marketing strategy; (6) degree of
purchaser care; (7) defendant's intent; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the products'
markets. Conglomerated Hosts, Ltd. v. Jepco, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1672, at *11
(6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1992) ("not recommended for full-text publication"). The Seventh Circuit
factors are: (1) similarity of appearance and suggestion between the trademarks; (2)
similarity between the subjects of the trademarks; (3) nature of the concurrent use of the
trademarks; (4) consumer care; (5) strength of plaintiff's trademark; (6) actual confusion;
and (7) defendant's intent. Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329
(7th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit factors are: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the
goods; (3) resemblance of the marks; (4) actual confusion; (5) marketing strategies; (6)
consumer care in light of product type; (7) defendant's intent in choosing the mark; and (8)
probability of product expansion. Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391
(9th Cir. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit factors are: (1) type of mark; (2) similarity of mark;
(3) similarity of products; (4) similarities between the plaintiff's and defendant's retail
outlets and customers; (5) similarity of advertisements; (6) defendant's intent in adopting
the trademark or tradename; and (7) actual confusion. Dieter, 880 F.2d at 322.
88. See supra note 85 (listing majority of circuits that employ clearly erroneous
review).
89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (requiring clearly erroneous review for all findings of
fact).
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According to the majority-rule circuits, clearly erroneous review
of likelihood of confusion determinations preserves the prestige of
trial judges by immunizing their decisions from reversal.90 Such
limited review also purportedly discourages appeals, helping to
conserve scarce judicial resources.91 For example, trademark litigants
will less frequently appeal trial court likelihood of confusion
determinations if the probability for reversal is slim.92
Moreover, trial judges have more exposure to live testimony than
appellate court judges.93 Trial court judges are, thus, amply qualified
to hear consumer or expert witness testimony about the confusion
factors.94 Accordingly, trial judges' experience gives them special
expertise in determining witness credibility regarding the confusion
factors.95 Therefore, these majority-rule circuits, by using the clearly
erroneous standard, indicate that trial judges may be able to weigh the
evidence of likelihood of confusion better than appellate judges.
Despite the policies that support limited review, not all circuits
agree that likelihood of confusion is a question of fact.97 Even the
minority circuits will not disturb a trial judge's findings regarding each
confusion factor unless those findings are clearly erroneous. 98 Minor
90. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
91. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 670 (4th ed. 1992); Stephen A.
Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1020, 1039-
41 (1967) (criticizing the view that limited review discourages appeals as oversimplistic).
As a related matter, some critics feel that by limiting avenues for appeals, litigants will
not view trial as merely a warm-up for an appeal. JAMES ET AL., supra, at 670. If litigants
view their trial court proceedings as potentially final, they may be more adamant in their
advocacy. Id. This rigor is consistent with the ideals of the adversarial system. See id.
(arguing that litigants without opportunity to appeal will focus their energies on trial
court).
92. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 1039-41 (stating that the value of limited review
depends on inhibiting appeals).
93. JAMES, supra note 91, at 669-70.
94. Id. at 669.
95. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985) (noting trial court
judges' skill in hearing testimony).
96. JAMES ET AL., supra note 91, at 669 (acknowledging that trial judges can better
assess oral testimony and witness credibility than appellate judges).
97. See infra note 100 (listing circuits that deny that likelihood of confusion is a
question of fact).
98. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:22 [2][c]; Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 465
U.S. 844, 845 (1982). The Ives Court announced that a reviewing court cannot reverse a
trial court finding merely because the reviewing court might give the facts another
interpretation. Id. (citing United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485,
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disagreement with the trial judge over the confusion factors, thus, will
not justify appellate reversal.99 Both the majority-rule circuits and the
minority-rule circuits, therefore, follow the same rule for factual,
underlying findings.
The minority-rule circuits, however, differ with the majority-rule
circuits because they view the overall likelihood of confusion
determination as a legal question. 100 These minority circuits will
reverse lower courts' ultimate determinations when they find that the
underlying facts found at trial mandate a different likelihood of
confusion decision. 10 1 This approach to the likelihood of confusion
inquiry acknowledges the inquiry's factual and legal aspects. 102 For
the minority-rule circuits, likelihood of confusion is a mixed question
of both fact and law.10 3 Consequently, these circuits permit de novo
495 (1950)).
99. See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1135 (2d Cir.
1979) (applying clearly erroneous standard to actual confusion factor because it is question
of fact).
100. See, e.g., Opryland USA Inc. v. The Great Am. Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847,
851 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (treating likelihood of confusion as question of law); Kellogg Co. v.
Pack'em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 332 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (granting judgment as matter of
law in likelihood of confusion issue); Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 73 F.3d 474,
478 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that a lower court's balancing of Polaroid factors is subject to de
novo review); Murphy v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 923 F.2d 923, 928
(2d Cir. 1990) (treating likelihood of confusion as question of law); Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that summary judgment is
appropriate in trademark infringement suits when no questions of fact remain); Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 1996) (declaring that whether
foundational factors establish likelihood of confusion is question of law); Wynn Oil Co. v.
American Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1991) (treating likelihood of
confusion as question of law).
101. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ. Co., 886 F.2d 490, 496
(2d Cir. 1989) (reversing district court's grant of preliminary injunction, finding a strong
likelihood of confusion was in error); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1185 (6th
Cir. 1988) (reversing district court's finding of no likelihood of confusion); In re Four
Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing finding of likelihood
of confusion in registration application).
102. Homeowner's Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th
Cir. 1991). The majority circuits do not recognize the dual approach. See, e.g., Scandia
Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427-29 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that
likelihood of confusion is entirely factual).
103. The Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584-85
(2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that court reviews final likelihood of confusion evaluation based
on de novo weighing of factors); Conglomerated Hosts, Ltd. v. Jepco, Inc., 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1672, at *10-11 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1992); Burns Philp Food, Inc. v. Modern Prod.,
Inc., No. 93-1038, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14877, at *4-7 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 1993).
1997]
review of likelihood of confusion determinations. 1 4
De novo review of likelihood of confusion determinations
furthers justice. Some trial judges will have inadequate knowledge of
trademark law. Consequently, appellate review of likelihood of
confusion decisions safeguards litigants from uninformed trial judges
and their incorrect rulings.10 5 In addition, judges must accurately
analyze consumer confusion surveys, compelling evidence in
trademark infringement cases, to fairly adjudicate likelihood of
confusion cases.106 Appellate court judges have more experience in
reading documentary evidence than trial court judges. 10 7 Accordingly,
by allowing de novo review of likelihood of confusion, courts
recognize the importance of likelihood of confusion surveys at trial
and appellate judges' superiority in assessing them.10 8 Furthermore,
because of the Supreme Court's limited capacity to hear appeals,
circuit courts now serve as courts of last resort in many trademark
infringement disputes. 10 9 Consequently, liberal involvement by
numerous circuit judges in likelihood of confusion appeals helps
guarantee justice by ensuring meaningful, thorough appellate
review.110
Thus, by following conflicting policy approaches, the circuit
courts are split over the proper scope of appellate review in trademark
infringement cases. 111 Both majority and minority-rule circuits follow
104. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer Inc., 14 F.3d 733, 742 (2d Cir. 1994) (using
district court's findings on likelihood of confusion factors to judge whether they establish
likelihood of confusion); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(considering all factors to find likelihood of confusion).
However, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges the legal and factual aspects of the
likelihood of confusion question. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352,
1355 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (conceding legal and factual nature of likelihood of
confusion inquiry). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit reviews trial court findings on a clearly
erroneous basis. Id.; Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993).
105. See Cooper, supra note 40, at 655-56; JAMES ET AL., supra note 91, at 670.
106. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:2 (stating that properly conducted surveys
are crucial in likelihood of confusion cases).
107. JAMES ET AL., supra note 91, at 670.
108. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 50, at 2 (stating that appeals limit negative
consequences of basic decisionmakers' shortcomings). See Louis, supra note 47, at 1015-16
& n.160 (revealing that appellate courts more carefully scrutinize certain notorious trial
judges' decisions than others' decisions).
109. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 50, at 201 (discussing en banc procedures).
110. See Louis, supra note 41, at 1014 (praising appellate panels as a system of checks
and balances).
111. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1043 (2d Cir.
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the same approach to underlying confusion factors.112 However, the
circuits differ over what review to grant likelihood of confusion
determinations. 11
3
This circuit court split frustrates the Lanham Act's goal of
providing uniformity in trademark law.114 Given the availability of
differing review standards, trademark litigants will often forum shop
to obtain procedural advantages that prevent just and equal
applications of the law across the nation.1 1  Trademark litigants also
face uncertainty because a circuit may simply decide to change its
1992); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 923 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986).
112. See, e.g., King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that
findings of fact are subject to clearly erroneous standard of review); Little Caesar Enters.,
Inc. v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 572 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983) for the proposition that clearly
erroneous review applies to likelihood of confusion factors).
All other circuit jurisdictions review the likelihood of confusion issue on a clearly
erroneous basis. See, e.g., Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329
(7th Cir. 1993) (reviewing likelihood of confusion as factual finding under clearly
erroneous standard); International Jensen Inc. v. Metro Sound U.S.A., Inc, 4 F.3d 819, 822,
825 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing likelihood of confusion as factual finding under clearly
erroneous standard); Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F2d 1253, 1259 (5th Cir.
1989) (declaring that likelihood of confusion is reversible only if clearly erroneous).
113. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (explaining that circuit conflict
focuses on final likelihood of confusion determination).
114. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting congressional intent to
federalize interstate commerce in trademarks). The scope of appellate review in trademark
infringement case5 has not been consistent even within a circuit. See Life Technologies,
Inc. v. Gibbco Scientific, Inc., 826 F.2d 775, 776-77 (8th Cir. 1987) (using de novo review
for likelihood of confusion issue); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398-99
(8th Cir. 1987) (reviewing likelihood of confusion on clearly erroneous basis according to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)'s requirement for questions of fact). The Eighth
Circuit finally resolved its own disagreement six years later. See ConAgra, Inc. v. George
A. Hormel & Co., 990 F.2d 368, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1993) (resolving uncertainty in the Eighth
Circuit by overruling Life Technologies). The Eighth Circuit now treats the likelihood of
confusion as a question of fact and accordingly uses clearly erroneous review. Id. at 371.
The Ninth Circuit has also been inconsistent. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc.,
778 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (declaring that Ninth Circuit regards
likelihood of confusion as both factual and legal, but reviewing as clearly erroneous). Prior
to Levi Strauss, the Ninth Circuit reviewed likelihood of confusion on a de novo basis. See
Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding that likelihood of confusion is reviewable de novo). Currently, however, the Ninth
Circuit reviews on a clearly erroneous basis. Pacific Telesis Group v. Int'l Telesis
Communications, 994 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1993).
115. Patricia J. Kaeding, Comment, Clearly Erroneous Review of Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact: The Likelihood of Confusion Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1291, 1303 (1992).
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scope of review of likelihood of confusion. 116 This paper thus provides
a solution to the legal conflict in light of the Lanham Act's silence.117
III
Proposal: Likelihood of Confusion is a Legal Conclusion
Circuit disagreement over the proper scope of likelihood of
confusion review frustrates the Lanham Act's goal of uniformity in
trademark law. 118 Neither Congress nor the circuit courts have
resolved this conflict.119 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has refused
to address the issue.120 This article proposes that Congress, to clarify
the appropriate standard of review in trademark infringement cases,
should amend the Lanham Act to state:
"Final likelihood of confusion determinations are questions of
law, and, thus, subject to de novo review." 121
Under this proposal, the confusion factors remain questions of
fact.122 Accordingly, courts will review them under the clearly
erroneous standard. 123  The final likelihood of confusion
determination, however, is one of law, and thus subject to de novo
review.124
116. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (listing circuits that have changed their
standard of review of likelihood of confusion).
117. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining that Lanham Act attempted
to promote uniformity in trademark law).
118. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining Congress' goal of uniformity
in trademark protection).
119. See supra notes 85-110 and accompanying text (detailing circuit conflict over
appellate review of likelihood of confusion).
120. See McMonagle v. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 901, 904 (1989) (White,
J., dissenting) (stating in dissent that Court should resolve circuit disagreement over
likelihood of confusion); Euroquilt, Inc. v. Scandia Down Corp., 475 U.S. 1147, 1154 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Court's denial of certiorari to resolve likelihood of
confusion conflict); Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., v. Frisch's Restaurants., Inc., 459
U.S. 916, 917 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Court's denial of certiorari to
resolve likelihood of confusion conflict).
121. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988) (lacking provision that addresses whether
likelihood of confusion is question of fact or question of law).
122 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (listing confusion factors).
123. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (describing clearly erroneous review
of confusion factors).
124. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (describing de novo review of
likelihood of confusion).
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Several rationales support this proposal.125 First, the de novo
standard better serves judicial policies than the clearly erroneous
standard.126 Second, answering the likelihood of confusion question
draws u on appellate courts' special expertise in formulating legal
norms. 1  Finally, courts recognize that determinations analogous to
the likelihood of confusion determination in non-trademark contexts
are mixed questions of fact and law, and, thus, subject to de novo
review.128
A. Policy Considerations
By categorizing issues as either factual or legal, courts make
policy choices between limited or liberal appellate review.129 Critics of
this Proposal may argue that clearly erroneous review better protects
trial court prestige by limiting appellate court opportunities to
overrule trial courts.130 Overruling trial courts in these situations
without a "clearly erroneous" label, however, merely suggests subtle
legal misunderstandings. 131 The appellate courts's disagreement with
the trial court, thus, does not necessarily attack a trial judge's
competence.132 Appellate review, therefore, neither inflicts morale
problems on trial judges nor derogates them to an inferior judicial
status.13
3
125. See infra notes 150-163 and accompanying text (advocating that likelihood of
confusion is legal question).
126. See infra notes 131-147 and accompanying text (questioning policy arguments that
favor clearly erroneous review for likelihood of confusion).
127. See infra notes 150-163 and accompanying text (classifying likelihood of confusion
as inquiry falling within traditional scope of appellate court duties).
128. See infra notes 164-182 and accompanying text (comparing likelihood of confusion
to patent law's obviousness standard).
129. Cooper, supra note 40, at 659-60.
130. See supra notes 44,46 and accompanying text (defining de novo review and clearly
erroneous review).
131. See supra note 44 (defining clearly erroneous). If appellate judges disagree with
lower court findings and must maneuver in the face of limited appellate power, trial judge
prestige may in fact decline. Weiner, supra note 91, at 1039-41. An "active" appeals court
in conflict with the trial court may label the offending decision belowlas clearly erroneous
if it has no other choice but to declare better law. Id. In these instances, clearly erroneous
review may indeed threaten unsuspecting trial court judges. Id.
132. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts:
Relationships in the Future, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 77 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 1989) (observing that trial judges welcome most
appellate court involvement except reversal).
133. Louis, supra note 41, at 1015.
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Additionally, critics might argue that the clearly erroneous
standard maximizes judicial economy by discouraging appeals. 134
These critics might claim that many litigants will not appeal because
they will be unable to prove that trial court decisions were obviously
incorrect. 135 Concerns about preserving scarce judicial resources,
however, do not necessarily favor clearly erroneous review of
trademark cases for two reasons. 136 First, no evidence supports the
assertion that independent appellate review would increase litigation
in jurisdictions that currently employ the clearly erroneous
standard.137 Indeed, jurisdictions that employ the clearly erroneous
standard may experience increased caseloads because trial judges
cannot decide factual issues on summary judgment. 138 Rather, if
likelihood of confusion is a question of fact, then the trial judge must
determine likelihood of confusion only after a full trial. 139
Consequently, clearly erroneous review would actually expend judicial
resources.
140
The second reason why clearly erroneous review does not further
judicial economy is that litigants in expensive trademark cases will
probably appeal regardless of the scope of appellate review.141 After a
substantial investment in trial preparation, litigants will spend the
relatively modest additional amount of money to appeal.142 Thus,
many rationales for promoting judicial economy do not apply to
134. See Kaeding, supra note 115, at 1303 (arguing that clearly erroneous review of
likelihood of confusion enhances judicial economy).
135. See id. (promoting appellate court deference to trial court findings).
136. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 1039-41 (stating that some judges may not allow
economic considerations to influence scope of appellate review). Some judges may believe
that justice requires overturning all wrong determinations, not just the clearly erroneous
ones. Id.
137. Louis, supra note 41, at 1015.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Reynolds, supra note 28, at 771. Reynolds argues that
promoting judicial economy alone should not validate de novo review. Id. at 773. Reynolds
also asserts that efficiency and cost effectiveness do not justify appellate encroachment
into a trial judge's domain. Id. However, this paper argues that de novo review does not
infringe on the traditional roles of trial judges. See infra notes 150-163 and accompanying
text (advocating de novo review of likelihood of confusion because it falls within historical
appellate court duties).
139. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (entitling moving party to summary judgment only if no
genuine issue of material fact remains).
140. Id.
141. Weiner, supra note 91, at 1039-42.
142. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 50, at 5 (contending that one reason for
increase in number of appeals is relative decreased cost of appeals).
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trademark infringement cases.
Critics might also argue that trial courts are the more able judicial
body to examine evidence of likelihood of confusion. They might cite
trial courts' expertise in hearing live testimony.143 Important
evidentiary concerns, however, actually compel increased appellate
court review of likelihood of confusion. 144 Surveys often help courts
decide likelihood of confusion between two trademarks.145
Accordingly, courts skilled in analyzing documentary evidence should
evaluate surveys.146 Since appellate bodies are as equally skilled in
considering documentary evidence as trial judges, litigants should
have access to appellate review.147 Appellate courts' experience in
reviewing documentary evidence and records favors liberal appellate
court involvement in analyzing likelihood of confusion surveys. 148
Thus, commentators' contentions that generally support limited
appellate review do not apply well to trademark infringement cases.
Judicial policies and appellate court expertise in interpreting
documentary evidence favor plenary appellate court involvement in
likelihood of confusion decisions by trial courts. In addition to these
concerns, the likelihood of confusion question also requires appellate
courts to exercise their traditional, law-corrective function. 149
143. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 91, at 669-70 (stating that trial judges are skilled in
many evidentiary matters).
144. See infra notes 150-163 and accompanying text (associating likelihood of confusion
determination with appellate courts' functions).
145. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:2(B); see also JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK
PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 8.11 (1992) (stating that courts regard surveys as most
probative evidence of likelihood of confusion).
Generally, plaintiffs may use three methods to prove likelihood of confusion: (1)
employing the results of a properly conducted survey; (2) presenting evidence of actual
confusion such as introducing evidence that the plaintiff's employees received mail from
consumers intending contact with the defendant; and (3) relying on a judicial
determination of likely confusion based on direct examination of the trademarks by judges
themselves. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:2(B).
146. See Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41
MINN. L. REV. 751, 782 (1957) (noting that trial judge has advantage of first sifting entire
record and arranging into logical sequence).
147. JAMES ET AL., supra note 91, at 670.
148. See supra Part II (discussing benefit of liberal appellate court involvement in
likelihood of confusion determination).
149. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 50, at 2 (explaining that appellate courts
review within range of error law allows trial judge); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985) (explaining that allocating judicial authority
between trial and appellate courts may depend on capabilities of each court).
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B. A Law Application Approach to Consumer Reactions
Exercising their duty to correct and formulate law, appellate
courts should review the trial court's likelihood of confusion
determinations de novo because trial courts apply legal standards to
confusion factors. The degree of likelihood of confusion necessary to
enjoin a defendant's use of her infringing trademark is a legal question
because it requires more than mere observation. 150 Because likelihood
of confusion requires judicial attempts to define a governing norm, the
likelihood of confusion inquiry implicates appellate courts' duty to say
what the law is.151
Essentially, likelihood of confusion- is a dual question of fact and
law. On one level, trial judges can easily determine confusion factors
because they only require evidentiary analysis. 152 For example, a
judge will detect trademark resemblance in form, sound, or spelling by
superficial inspection. 153 At most, the confusion factors will tap the
trial judge's expertise in assessing evidence. 154
However, after finding basic confusion factors, a trial judge will
150. Colburn v. Puritan Mills, Inc., 108 F.2d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 1939). Instead, the
ultimate conclusion will rest on a subjective application of a subtle legal standard. See id.
(stating that judicial analysis of likelihood of confusion involves contemplation,
speculation, and weighing of chances for mistake).
151. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,289 n.19 (1982).
152. See, e.g., Genny's Diner & Pub, Inc. v. Sweet Daddy's, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 744, 747
(W.D. Ky. 1993) (finding trademark resemblance upon hearing defendant's trademark);
DAP Products, Inc. v. Color Tile Mfg., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 488, 492 (S.D. Ohio 1993)
(determining strength of plaintiff's trademark from actual consumer recognition of
trademark); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 784 F. Supp. 648, 678 (E.D. Mo. 1992)
(using testimony of confused purchaser to find actual confusion); see also supra note 87
(listing various confusion factors).
153. See Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774, 775 (7th Cir.
1927) (explaining that infringement exists when allegedly infringing trademark is so like
another in form, spelling, or sound that it will confuse consumer with imprecise
recollection of infringed trademark).
154. See Kaeding, supra note 115, at 1315 (recognizing trial judge's skill in evaluating
witness credibility and weighing evidence) (citing Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 855 (1982)). Kaeding argued that likelihood of confusion is largely a factual issue.
Id. Accordingly, she believed that trial judges would best handle the question by utilizing
their expertise in handling evidence. Id. This article concedes that trial judges do have
great skill in deciding evidentiary matters. However, this article establishes that the
likelihood of confusion question also retains legal characteristics. See infra notes 155-163
and accompanying text (describing process where judges must reflect, rather than merely
observe, to determine likelihood of confusion).
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engage in a more analytical process.155 For example, suppose John
believes that pencils bearing his trademark SCRIBBLE alongside
Grant's pencils bearing the trademark SKRIBBLER will likely cause
confusion as to the source of both parties' pencils. Additionally,
suppose some consumers who saw both trademarks testified that
confusion about the source of John's pencils was very possible, yet
others testified that confusion was doubtful. 156 No consumer's
testimony could, by itself, definitively settle whether consumer
confusion was "likely" because courts lack an exact definition for
"likely."' 157 The definition of "likely," therefore, takes on legal
characteristics and courts must develop a standard for determining
how much "likelihood" constitutes infringement.
Generally, in the likelihood of confusion inquiry, courts use an
"ordinary prudent consumer" standard. Under this standard, courts
ask if a judicially-created "average" consumer would be able to
discriminate between two trademarks. 158 Likelihood of confusion
thus requires a judge to reflect on the degree of possibility of
consumer confusion.159 To decide likelihood of confusion, therefore, a
judge subjectively applies a subtle legal standard to confusion
factors. 160 Because the final decision requires discretionary judgment
155. See Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v. Mattress Madness, Inc., 841 F. Supp.
1339, 1342 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (avoiding mechanistic weighing of confusion factors);
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Crown Nation Bancorporation, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 882, 886
(W.D.N.C. 1993) (stating that confusion factors are not elements, but only guides in
determining likelihood of confusion).
156. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 19:2 (including consumer's testimony of actual
confusion is one way to prove likelihood of confusion).
157. See, e.g., Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that defendant's trademark that confused 7.6% of survey respondents did not
infringe plaintiff's trademark). One judge, however, disagreed, asserting that 7.6% was
enough confusion to find infringement. Id. at 365 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
158. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). The ordinarily prudent purchaser standard asks whether the
allegedly infringing trademark will likely mislead or confuse an appreciable number of
ordinarily prudent purchasers about the source of the goods in question. Id.
159. See Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion Issues: The Federal Circuit's
Standard of Review, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1221, 1234 (1992) (asking the Federal Circuit to
declare why it employs de novo review for likelihood of confusion).
160. See Colburn v. Puritan Mills, Inc., 108 F.2d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 1939) (noting that
trial judges have no formulaic scheme to tally results of findings about each underlying
confusion factor to mathematically derive whether confusion is "likely"). Moreover,
likelihood of confusion is a problem without a precise solution. The issue depends on
different human reactions and is not answerable by exact rule or measure. See id.; see also
1997]
in the application of law to facts, courts should consider likelihood of
confusion a legal decision.161 As a legal determination, likelihood of
confusion implicates appellate courts' duties to guide and develop
legal standards. 162 Accordingly, likelihood of confusion should fall
within the de novo review power of appellate courts.163
Janet S. Thomas, Comment, Likelihood of Confusion Under the Lanham Act. A Question
of Fact, a Question of Law, or Both?, 73 KY. L.J. 235, 253 (1984) (stating that judges
cannot formulaically arrive at likelihood of confusion decisions). Thomas argues that
because courts lack a well-defined framework to decide likelihood of confusion, appellate
courts should review on a clearly erroneous basis to respect lower court findings. Id. This
article, however, suggests that de novo review will protect trial court's findings in some
instances. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text (noting that labeling lower court
findings as clearly erroneous attacks trial court prestige).
161. See Roy L. Stone-de Montpensier, The Compleat Wrangler, 50 MINN. L. REV.
1001, 1009-10 & n.27 (1966) (characterizing answers to questions that judges derive from
reflection as questions of law); Cooper, supra note 40, at 660 (revealing that need for
review is factor in allocation of judicial power between trial and appellate courts).
Professor Cooper notes that characterizing a particular issue is merely a decision that one
judicial actor can better decide the issue in question than another judicial actor. Id. at 659.
Accordingly, judges can avert difficulties by not relying solely on draconian law and fact
categorizations. See JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.05 (2d
ed. 1985) (stating that rigid categorizations of law and fact are not helpful); see also infra,
note 169.
162. See Cooper, supra note 40, at 658 (stating that policy of appellate review is to
correct trial courts and to develop law).
The duty to declare and develop law in trademark cases is sometimes not implicated
when a case is highly fact-specific. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352,
1356 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting limited precedential value of a case that "stands upon its own
facts"). Nonetheless, many trademark disputes do implicate an appellate court's duty to
proclaim law and, thus, by precedent guide the future conduct of trademark owners. The
"crowded field" doctrine is one example that illustrates the precedential significance of
infringement determinations. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11.01[1] (3d ed. 1996).
Similar marks on similar goods having uncommon ownership comprise a "crowded
field" of marks. Id. § 11.01[1]. In a crowded field of similar marks, each trademark owner
thereof is relatively weak in her ability to prevent similar trademark usage by others in the
crowd. See, e.g., Miss World (U.K.) Ltd. v. Mrs. American Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445
(9th Cir. 1988). The rationale for the doctrine holds that, in such a crowd, customers have
carefully learned to pick out one trademark from another. Id. at 1449. Thus, the finding of
a crowded field by a court has substantial precedential value. The acknowledgment of a
crowded field to support a noninfringement finding could potentially invite new usage of
similar trademarks on similar goods that would otherwise constitute infringement. On the
other hand, a finding of infringement without the invocation of the crowded field doctrine
would discourage later trademark owners from using confusingly similar marks.
Accordingly, judicial determinations of trademark infringement in specific cases can serve
as powerful precedent by defining the permissible scope of future trademark usage.
163. Weiner, supra note 91, at 1034 (favoring free review when applying law to fact).
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C. Comparisons with Patent Law's Non-Obviousness Requirement
In determining legal guidelines and standards, courts often
investigate and analogize to various areas of law to help resolve
specific issues. 164 Trademark law is, in some ways, analogous to patent
law because both protect intellectual property.16 5 More specifically,
trademark law is similar to patent law in that both will typically
employ legal standards based on hypothetical persons in connection
with infringement determinations. To determine the validity of a
patent, as is often necessary in an infringement case, courts will
inquire whether a specific invention was "obvious." 166 Patent law's
obviousness standard uses an inventor of average skill. 167 Similarly,
trademark law uses an ordinarily prudent consumer to gauge possible
infringement. 168 Therefore, to characterize likelihood of confusion,
courts can analogize to patent law. 169 The manner in which courts
164. See, e.g., In re Stanley Hotel, Inc., 13 B.R. 926, 933 (1981) (employing non-
bankruptcy law to define "successor" in bankruptcy law); Lee I. Raiken, Extraterritorial
Application of RCRA: Is Its Exportability Going to Waste?, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 573, 611
(1993) (advocating study of non-environmental law to see if Congress should amend
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to apply abroad); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F.
Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A Practitioner's Perspective, 33 AM. U. L.
REV. 385, 399 (1984) (contending that insight from other areas of law helps to keep fresh
ideas flowing into legal specialty).
165. See infra notes 171-181 and accompanying text (comparing patent law and
trademark law).
166. See infra notes 171-176 and accompanying text (defining obviousness).
Nonobviousness is the most important and most frequently litigated of all the patentability
requirements. 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 5.02[6] (1996).
167. See In re Wright, 848 F.2d 1216, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (using knowledge of
ordinarily-skilled inventor to find obviousness); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan
Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 995, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that actual inventor's skill is
irrelevant in determining obviousness).
168. See supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text (describing ordinarily prudent
consumer).
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (citing analogies in other legal
contexts). Resort to recently developed principles in patent law is instructive. See
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). In Markman, the Supreme
Court considered, inter alia, whether the construction of patent claims are questions of law
or questions of fact. Id. After generally discussing the historical development of the
construction of writings, the Court indicated that precedent provided no clear resolution of
the issue. See id. at 1395. The Court emphasized that functional considerations should be
relevant in choosing between a judge and a jury. Id. Agreeing with the earlier case law, the
Court stated:
that when an issue 'falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a
simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a
determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial
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characterize the obviousness determination suggests how courts
should resolve the circuit split over likelihood of confusion. 170
To determine obviousness in patent cases, a judge uses the
inventor's hypothetical knowledge of all pertinent prior art to decide
if the invention is patent-worthy. 171 A judge must only consider the
actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.'
Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). Because it is better handled by
judges, the Court held that patent claim construction is a question of law. Markman, 116 S.
Ct. at 1395.
170. See Reynolds, supra note 28, at 767-69 (distinguishing likelihood of confusion from
patent law's obviousness and advocating clearly erroneous review for likelihood of
confusion).
171. For patent law purposes, the hypothetical person is deemed to know all the
relevant prior art. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Industries, Inc., 807 F.2d
955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This presumption complicates the obviousness doctrine since, as
courts have recognized, no one person can know of all relevant technical information. See
Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1980). This hypothetical person is
a legal construction, "a legal ghost called 'a person having ordinary skill in art' (like the
,reasonable man' ghost in negligence cases)." CHISUM, supra note 166, § 5.04[1] (citing
Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 911 (6th Cir. 1978)).
Courts use other hypothetical persons, in addition to inventors and consumers, to
define legal standards. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §
32, at 175 (5th ed. 1988 Supp.) (introducing reasonably prudent person in tort law's
negligence). In negligence, a reasonably prudent person standard inquires whether a
defendant acted with the legally required caution. Id. A negligence case involves whether
the defendant acted with the proper care that a reasonable person of ordinary prudence
would have exercised. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 490 (C.P. 1837).
Traditionally, negligence has four elements: (1) a legal duty requiring the person to protect
others against risk; (2) that person's breach of that duty; (3) a legally-required causal
connection between the person's action and resulting injury; and (4) actual injury to
another's interest. See KEETON ET AL., supra, § 30. What matters is the objective standard
of conduct the community demands of the actor. Low v. Park Price Co., 503 P.2d 291
(1972). All circuits, except the Second Circuit, view negligence as a question of fact. See
Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774, 784 (2d Cir. 1969) (reviewing negligence on de novo
basis because it is question of law); Vollendorff v. United States, 951 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir.
1991) (ruling that negligence requires clearly erroneous review); Athas v. United States,
907 F.2d 142, 142-44 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that negligence is question of fact);
Kaeding, supra note 115, at 1314 (noting that only Second Circuit allows de novo review of
negligence determination).
Interestingly, Professor Weiner differentiates between jury and nonjury cases in
negligence matters. Weiner, supra note 91, at 1033. In jury cases, he argues that the
"reasonable man standard" should be a question of fact for the jury. Id. However, he
considers nonjury negligence determinations to be questions of law. Id. He reasons that, by
analogy to jury cases, appellate court judges are better situated to decide the negligence
issue than are trial judges acting alone. Id. Moreover, Judge Learned Hand's formula helps
judges to determine negligence. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 170
(2d Cir. 1947) (deriving rule to determine negligence). Using Judge Hand's formula, a
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hypothetical inventor's knowledge of other similar inventions at a
legally predetermined time.172 A court considers a number of factors
in comparing a new invention's features with the prior art.173 The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals, 174 treats these factors as questions of
fact.175 A court's ultimate obviousness conclusion based on these
judge will ask if the cost of adequate precautions was less than the probability of injury
multiplied by damages from the resulting injury. Id. Likelihood of confusion, in contrast,
requires involved inquiries without mathematical precision. See supra notes 150-152
(describing subjectivity in determining likelihood of confusion).
172. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987). Obviousness is whether the subject matter that an inventor
seeks to patent and the prior art make the invention obvious to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which the subject matter relates. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
1-5 (1966); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). To facilitate this inquiry, a judge must
travel back in time to view the invention without current know-how. Panduit Corp., 810
F.2d at 1566. The first steps in the obviousness inquiry involve determining the merits of
the prior art and the nature of the inventor's improvement over the prior art. Armour &
Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143, 156 (7th Cir. 1960). These determinations are questions
of fact. Id. at 156. Nonetheless, the application of section 103 and the skill of the
hypothetical inventor in assessing the merits of the claimed invention involves the
application of the proper legal standard to factual questions. Id "This calls for the exercise
of a legal judgment and as such is subject to review by an appellate tribunal as a question
of law." Id.
173. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 378-79 (explaining multitude of tests for
obviousness). The test is a multi-level test of primary and secondary factors. See id.
(introducing various tests). The primary factors are: (1) the nature of the prior art; (2) the
difference between preexisting technology and the claims at issue; and (3) the level of
ordinary skill in the invention's subject area. See R.L. Sherman, Obviousness: A Question
of Law or of Fact?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 547, 550 (1969) (breaking down Patent Act
section 103 into three primary factors). Professor Chisum has stated, "[t]he conclusion as
to the obviousness of an invention turns on whether a hypothetical person with ordinary
skill and knowledge in the art to which the invention pertains with full knowledge of all the
pertinent prior art, when faced with the problem to which the claimed invention is
addressed, would be led naturally to the solution adopted in the claimed invention or at
least would naturally view that solution as an available alternative." CHISUM, supra note
166, § 5.0411].
In addition, the Supreme Court has announced a list of secondary considerations that
help illuminate the proper standard of invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 1. Such secondary
considerations include commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and failure of
others. Id.
This list of factors is not exhaustive. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, at 379 (citing
factors other than six that Graham Court explicitly mentioned); see also Graham, 383 U.S.
at 3 (using language that implied existence of other obviousness factors).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1996).
175. See Panduit Corp., 810 F.2d at 1566 (stating that primary and secondary John
Deere factors are questions of fact); In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
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factors, however, is a question of law.
176
A judge analyzes likelihood of confusion in a way that resembles
how a judge analyzes obviousness. With no precise legal formula to
instruct judges on how to weigh the various confusion factors, the
likelihood of confusion test resembles the obviousness analysis from
patent law.177 Both likelihood of confusion and obviousness require
judges to decide underlying facts that help define the dispute's
context.178 These factors, taken together, lay the basis for a judge's
subjective conclusion about whether the invention or the trademark
meets a legally required threshold. 179
Both likelihood of confusion and obviousness questions are also
similar in that they cannot be resolved by direct, formulaic tests. To
resolve a likelihood of confusion question in a trademark case, a judge
has the formidable task of predicting product association in the minds
of various potential consumers, who undoubtedly possess contrasting
sensibilities.180 Likewise, a judge in a patent case may struggle to
(stating that primary and secondary John Deere factors are questions of fact); see also
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 380-81 (discussing importance of whether obviousness is
question of law or fact).
176. Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566; John Deere, 383 U.S. at 485. The final obviousness
determination is a question of law for all circuits, except possibly the First and Tenth
Circuits. CHISUM, supra note 166, § 5.04[3]. However, because of the Federal Circuit's
special jurisdiction over patent matters, regional circuit law will be more of historical
import rather than legal precedent. Id.
177. See The Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers and Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1993) (stating that evaluation of confusion factors to determine likelihood of confusion
is a balancing test, not a mechanical test); Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle Co., 171 F.
Supp. 671 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (explaining that judges had no precise rule to solve likelihood of
confusion issue in instant case); Maureen McGirr, Note, Panduit Corp. v. Dennison
Manufacturing Co.: De Novo Review and the Federal Circuit's Application of the Clearly
Erroneous Standard, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 963, 963 (1987) (describing difficulty in
distinguishing between fact and law in patent cases).
178. See supra notes 87, 173 (listing confusion factors and Graham factors).
179. See B. E. Colaianni, 35 U.S.C. § 103: A Quest for Objectivity, 39 FED. B.J. 23, 28
(1980) (addressing obviousness). Colaianni concedes that a judge could imagine herself to
be a reasonable person. Id. However, he argues that a judge cannot analogize her
experience to adequately sympathize with inventors in highly technical fields. Id.
180. Reynolds, supra note 28, at 749; Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera
Co., 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971).
In a famous tax case, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), the Court
handled the similar issue of a transferor's intent. See id. at 293 (holding that transferor's
intent is question of fact). The Court explained that the intent of a transferor clearly calls
upon the trial court's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct. Id. As a result,
the majority considered the transferor's intent a question of fact. Id. However, in a
concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter observed that experience with
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conjure the knowledge and skill of a hypothetical technologist. 181 In
short, likelihood of confusion issues and obviousness issues both
require technical considerations for which judges cannot simply draw
upon their everyday experience or intuition. The parallels between
likelihood of confusion and obviousness warrant similar judicial
treatment. Accordingly, courts should view likelihood of confusion as
a question of law, as they do obviousness in patent law.182
Congress should, therefore, amend the Lanham Act to allow
independent review of likelihood of confusion. This amendment
furthers the judicial goals of ensuring justice and promoting efficiency.
In addition, this amendment would respect the traditional role of
appellate courts by entrusting to them questions that require
discretionary judgment to define legal norms. Patent law already
entrusts such questions to appellate judges.
Iv
Conclusion
Rule 52(a) ensures that judges reverse findings of fact only when they
are clearly erroneous. 183 The rule, however, does not define a
question of fact.184 In trademark law issues, policy considerations do
not provide clear guidance about the applicability of Rule 52(a) to a
likelihood of confusion question. 185 However, closer study of the
nature of the likelihood of confusion standard supports treating the
standard as a legal question. A trial judge's expertise sufficiently
masters confusion factors because they are straightforward,
evidentiary findings. However, to determine likelihood of confusion
based on confusion factors, a judge must deliberate extensively over
how trademarks are "likely" to influence varying consumer
sensibilities. This process of judicial reflection and law application
human affairs is diverse and also often drastically conflicting. Id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
181. See Societe Anonyme de La Grande Distiliere E. Cusemier Fils Aire & Cie v.
Julius Wile Sons & Co., 161 F. Supp. 595, 597 (D.C.N.Y. 1958) (emphasizing that trial
judge's determination about obviousness depends on trial judge's visceral reactions).
182. See CARRINGTON, supra note 132, at 77-78 (explaining proper role of appellate
courts). Carrington notes that trials are becoming longer and more complex. Id.
Accordingly, he advocates more appellate oversight when courts must decide issues
requiring technical expertise. Id.
183. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
184. See id. (omitting provision identifying questions of fact).
185. See supra notes 90-96, 100-110 and accompanying text (addressing policy
concerning limited and liberal review for likelihood of confusion).
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falls within the traditional expertise of appellate courts. Consequently,
likelihood of confusion should fall within the de novo review power of
appellate courts.
